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Abstract
Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclu-
sionary conduct by a smaller rival or entrant. Importantly, the firms in such cases
generally have asymmetric stakes: the defendant typically has a much larger financial
interest on the line. We explore the broad policy implications of this fact using a
novel model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead dominant
defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing the plain-
tiff’s success probability to fall below the efficient level—a distortion that carries over
to ex ante settlements. We explain that enhanced damages may reduce the problem,
but cannot eliminate it. We also show that, in most areas of private law, asymmetric
stakes do not distort litigation outcomes in this way; the distortion arises in antitrust
only because it proscribes certain ex post settlements, and this constraint influences
incentives at the litigation stage. Finally, we consider how courts could correct the
distortion created by asymmetric stakes by altering plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden.
∗We thank Andrew Gavil and Fiona Scott Morton for helpful discussions.
†Assistant Professor, USC Gould School of Law.
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1 Introduction
Private antitrust litigation frequently involves a dominant firm being accused of anticompet-
itive exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival or prospective entrant. A key fact about such
disputes, which is independent of the underlying merit of the antitrust claim, is that the
defendant typically has a markedly larger financial stake in the outcome of litigation. The
dominant firm is looking to protect monopoly profits, while the smaller plaintiff is seeking to
maintain a modest position in a more competitive market. The result is that the defendant
has an incentive to spend significantly more to thwart the plaintiff’s efforts than the latter
would pay to maintain a foothold in the marketplace.1
For example, suppose a dominant firm is accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival.
If the defendant’s conduct is allowed to persist, the rival will go out of business, resulting
in a monopoly profit of $100 for the defendant and no profits for the plaintiff. By contrast,
if a court issues an injunction to halt the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff will stay in
business and earn $15 through ordinary competition, while the defendant will earn $55. As
these numbers reflect, monopoly—whether obtained through anticompetitive conduct or a
procompetitieve efficiency—typically generates larger total profits than competition. The
result is that the defendant must have a larger stake in the outcome of litigation.2 For
instance, on these numbers, the plaintiff stands to gain $15 by winning, while the defendant
stands to gain $45 if the plaintiff’s claim fails.3
In this paper we examine the broad implications of asymmetric stakes for antitrust policy
and enforcement. We develop a novel model of litigation with endogenous effort, meaning
that each firm can choose how much resources to invest in litigation in order to influence
its chances of prevailing. One of our key initial results is that the asymmetry leads domi-
nant defendants to invest significantly more in litigation, resulting in the plaintiff’s winning
probability being biased; that is, the plaintiff’s winning probability is strictly lower than the
normatively optimal level, as determined by the merits of its complaint. The result is that
litigation outcomes are systematically distorted in defendants’ favor. This undermines de-
terrence of anticompetitive practices. Moreover, while enhanced damages can help to reduce
the extent of the problem, they can never eliminate it.
In our model, a court renders a final decision based on a noisy signal that depends on both:
(a) the underlying merit of the plaintiff’s complaint, which can range from very strong to
1An analogous disparity was studied in the context of R&D competition in Gilbert and Newbery (1982).
2The asymmetry will be even larger if the plaintiff’s victory would also facilitate entry by third parties.
3Damages would not change this conclusion, as they are just a one-to-one transfer between the firms.
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very weak; and (b) the firms’ choices of how much to invest in litigation. When the firms
invest equal amounts, the signal is unbiased, and hence the plaintiff’s winning probability is
entirely commensurate with the merit of its complaint. But when the firms invest different
amounts—as they always do in equilibrium—the probability will always be biased away from
the optimal level, favoring the firm who spent more.
Consideration of endogenous effort in litigation is particularly apropos in the antitrust con-
text, where discovery is often very broad-sweeping and complex and the parties spend large
amounts on economic consultants and expert witnesses for both liability and damages. Eco-
nomic evidence plays a significant role in the outcome, and the parties can spend an enor-
mous amount on econometric studies and simulation models, and on rigorous critiques of
each other’s analyses. The judge, meanwhile, is unlikely to be well-versed in the relevant
economic issues and methodologies. This means that a firm’s spending on economic experts
can be very fruitful, for the court is likely to rely heavily on the parties’ experts to understand
the complexities of the case.
We also analyze the interplay between asymmetric stakes and settlement. We show that,
in most other areas of private litigation, asymmetric stakes do not lead to any inefficient
distortion in the equilibrium probability that the plaintiff will prevail; this result is very
general and occurs because of the way that the prospect of ex post (post-judgment) set-
tlement influences incentives at the litigation stage. But antitrust law generally prohibits
otherwise-profitable settlements in which a losing defendant pays the plaintiff for the right to
continue a practice that has just been declared anticompetitive. As a result, the prospect of
ex post settlement does not prevent the firms’ asymmetric stakes from distorting litigation
outcomes in equilibrium. We further consider ex ante (pre-judgment) settlements, and show
that the distortion created by asymmetric stakes translates into settlement outcomes that
are less competitive than they ideally would be.
As we show, one way to countervail the distortion created by asymmetric stakes is to modify
the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden. We do this by considering judicial reliance on presump-
tions, which act to predispose the court toward one outcome or the other. We compute the
optimal presumption, which may be influenced in part based on the court’s priors about
the nature of the defendant’s conduct—namely, its propensity to cause anticompetitive ef-
fects. Finally, we consider whether the problem of asymmetric stakes can be avoided when
the plaintiff is a class of injured consumers. However, based on certain externality and
principal-agent problems, we conclude that the asymmetry is likely to persist in these cases.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: following a review of related literature,
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Section 2 formulates the model, explores its properties and shows why damages are unlikely
to correct the bias in trial outcomes. Section 3 analyzes settlements. Section 4 shows how the
bias can be corrected by adjusting the evidentiary standard with a corrective presumption.
Finally, Section 5 considers extensions involving class action litigation and fee shifting.
1.1 Related Literature
Our analysis contributes to the literature on the economics of private litigation. Cooter and
Rubinfeld (1989) and Spier (2007) discuss some of the major issues in this literature. While
some papers give special attention to inter-party asymmetries, the most common one by far
is an asymmetry between the parties’ beliefs about who is more likely to win, which is an
important factor in determining whether the parties will settle (e.g. Priest and Klein, 1984;
Waldfogel, 1998; Lee and Klerman, 2016). Some papers make litigation effort endogenous,
in which case the parties’ investments can be modeled as a game (e.g. Choi and Sanchirico,
2004). However, such papers typically do not focus on any particular field of law, whereas
our analysis incorporates various phenomena that are specific to antitrust.
The asymmetric stakes in inter-competitor antitrust litigation arise because it is more prof-
itable to preserve monopoly power than to invigorate competition. In their seminal paper,
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) considered the same profit disparity in the context of R&D
competition. By contrast, we explore its impact on antitrust enforcement via litigation with
endogenous effort, which similarly involves a kind of investment game between rivals.
A large body of antitrust writing focuses on the relative social costs associated with differ-
ent kinds of judicial errors (false negatives versus false positives) in antitrust litigation (e.g.
Schwartz, 1979; Evans and Padilla, 2005). Easterbrook (1984) famously argued that an-
titrust standards should embody a strong preference for erring on the side of false negatives
(mistaken acquittals); the given rationale is that markets will typically correct these errors
organically over time. However, many authors dispute the correctness of this argument and
its core premises (e.g. Devlin and Jacobs, 2010; Baker, 2015). Similarly, many papers argue
that antitrust’s prevailing standards for dealing with exclusionary practices by dominant
firms are broadly inadequate (e.g. Salop, 2005; Federico et al., 2020; Gavil and Salop, 2020).
This debate is timely in light of the current legislative efforts to reform monopolization law,
including Senator Amy Klobuchar’s recently introduced bill, which would create anticompet-
itive presumptions and reduce the enforcement agencies’ (but not private plaintiffs’) burden
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of proof in monopolization cases.4
There are numerous theoretical papers on antitrust that relate to ours. Schwartz and Wick-
elgren (2011) addresses the efficacy of private antitrust litigation between rivals in curtailing
undesirable exclusionary practices. While we discuss deterrence in Section 2.3, our focus is
primarily on the inefficiencies created by asymmetric stakes when litigation effort is endoge-
nous. Choi and Spier (2019) consider the ability of class action litigation to deter collusive
behavior, which we address in the context of excluionary conduct in Section 5. There are
many papers addressing antitrust restrictions on settlement.5 Although these focus mainly
on IP settlements, the arguments are often analogous.
Many papers attempt to derive various optimal legal standards by relying in part on Bayesian
inference, such as Kaplan (1967), Posner (1998), Ayres and Nalebuff (2015), and Salop
(2015).6 In Section 4, we similarly rely on Bayesian inference in considering judicial reliance
on presumptions to modify plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden.
2 Model
In this section, we introduce our baseline game of litigation with endogenous effort and
derive the equilibrium. There are two competing firms, i = 1, 2. Firm 2 (the defendant) is a
dominant firm that is being sued by firm 1, who is a smaller rival (or a prospective entrant).
Firm 1 is alleging that firm 2 is engaging in an exclusionary practice (e.g. exclusive dealing,
tying, or acquisitions of critical input suppliers). Firm 2’s conduct generates a change w in
consumer welfare. The interpretation is that the defendant’s conduct is anticompetitive (and
therefore unlawful under antitrust’s consumer welfare standard) if w < 0, but procompetitive
if w ≥ 0. We assume that the value of w is common knowledge as between the firms, but
cannot be directly observed by any third parties, such as judges or antitrust authorities.
At the outset of litigation, we assume the two firms make simultaneous choices of litigation
expenditures, denoted xi ≥ 0 for each firm i.7 Each litigant must choose the number and
4The proposed bill is entitled the “Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct Prevention Act of 2020.”
5See, e.g., Meurer (1989); Shapiro (2003); Edlin et al. (2015); Hovenkamp (2018); Hovenkamp and Lemus
(2019). See also Friedman and Wickelgren (2008) for a more general discussion of how private settlements
may sometimes countervail substantive policy interests.
6See also Kaplow (2011), which considers a non-Bayesian notion of optimal proof burdens.
7In practice, one expects that there is some bare-minimum cost ci > 0 that a litigant must incur, although
it may opt to make an additional discretionary expenditure xi to improve its chances. However, we normalize
c1 = c2 = 0.
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quality of attorneys, experts, and consultants it will hire, which will influence the strength
of its position in litigation, and xi captures the total cost of those choices. We thus interpret
xi as a measure of firm i’s endogenous effort in litigation; all else being equal, an increase in
xi will increase its probability of winning the case.
If the court could directly observe the consumer welfare effect w, then there would be no
risk of errors in litigation outcomes: the court would correctly condemn every anticompeti-
tive practice, while also correctly condoning every efficient one. However, due to imperfect
information and the complexities of antitrust subject matter, this is not possible. Instead,
we assume that the court observes only a stochastic signal (a noisy estimate) of w, given by
y ∼ Φ(·|x, w).
That is, y is drawn from a signal distribution Φ that depends on both the true welfare effect
w and the strategy profile x = (x1, x2). However, the court does not observe w or x; it
observes only the noisy signal y, which it relies upon as its estimate of w. Accordingly, the
court rules in the plaintiff’s favor if y < 0 and in the defendant’s favor if y ≥ 0.
In this way, the court renders a decision by relying on the signal y as if it is an unbiased
estimate in the sense that E[y|x, w] = w, although this is not necessarily true. We assume
for now that, if the signal is biased (E[y|x, w] 6= w), this is attributable solely to asymmetric
litigation expenditures. That is, Φ is in general biased, but it reduces to an unbiased
distribution in the symmetric case x1 = x2. Further, we assume that such bias always favors
the firm that spends more. These points are captured by the following pair of assumptions,
which also provide intuitive and tractable comparative statics.
Assumption 1. Φ obeys the relation
Φ(y|x, w) = F (y|w)x1
F (y|w)x1 + [1− F (y|w)]x2 , (1)
where F (y|w) is a cumulative distribution function with density f(y|w) ≡ ∂F (y|w)/∂y and
support R.8
8Technically condition (1) is undefined when x1 = x2 = 0. But note that Φ = F whenever x1 = x2 > 0.
Thus, we may naturally assume that Φ = F when x1 = x2 = 0 as well. But this is ultimately irrelevant, as
the firms will always choose x1, x2 > 0 in equilibrium.
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Assumption 2. f(y|w) is symmetric about w and depends only on the difference |y −w|.9
The proposition below describes several important implications of these assumptions. (All
omitted proofs are in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. Φ has the following properties:
(i) E[y|x, w] = w if and only if x1 = x2.
(ii) Φ(y|x′, w) < Φ(y|x, w) if and only if x′2/x′1 > x2/x1.
(iii) Φ(y|x, w′) < Φ(y|x, w) if and only if w′ > w.
These results capture a number of desirable and intuitive properties, which we now discuss
in turn.
Expenditure-driven bias. Condition (i) states that the signal distribution is unbiased
if and only if litigation expenditures are symmetric, because Φ reduces to an unbiased dis-
tribution F when x1 = x2. By contrast, Φ skews away from F when expenditures are
asymmetric. By condition (ii), this bias always favors the firm who spends more: if firm
2 spends more, then higher values of y become relatively more likely (which benefits firm
2), as compared to the symmetric case, whereas the opposite occurs if firm 1 spends more.
More concretely, condition (ii) implies that, if x′2/x′1 > x2/x1, then Φ(·|x′, w) is first-order
stochastically dominant over Φ(·|x, w), and vice versa.
Expenditure offset. Condition (ii) also implies that the firms’ litigation expenditures off-
set one another to some extent. This is because condition (ii) implies that Φ is homogeneous
of degree zero with respect to x: it obeys Φ(·|λx, w) = Φ(·|x, w) for any scalar λ > 0. In
words, if both expenditures are scaled up or down by a common factor, the distribution is
left unchanged.
Dependence on w. Finally, condition (iii) says that the true welfare effect w affects the
signal distribution independently of x, implying that the underlying merit of the plaintiff’s
complaint always matters, as one would expect. Specifically, if w′ > w, then Φ(·|x, w′)
first-order stochastically dominates Φ(·|x, w). Thus, for example, if w is highly negative
(corresponding to a highly anticompetitive practice), then the expected value of y will be
negative unless firm 2 outspends firm 1 by a sufficiently large amount.
9The latter condition means that for any w and w′ we have f(w − a|w) = f(w′ − a|w′) for any scalar a.
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2.1 Outcome Probabilities and Claim Strength
We define α = α(w) by
α ≡ F (0|w). (2)
Thus, α gives the probability that firm 1 will win (conditional on w) when the signal distribu-
tion is unbiased. (Note that α is always interior.10) We may thus regard α as the normatively
optimal winning probability for firm 1, conditional on w. This reflects an assumption that so-
ciety prefers for courts’ decisions to be unbiased.11 Further, we can interpret α as a measure
of the strength (i.e. merit) of the plaintiff’s antitrust claim, since it is inversely related to w,
which captures the actual consumer welfare effect of the defendant’s conduct. Thus, highly
anticompetitive practices (w  0) have α close to unity; highly procompetitive practices
(w  0) have α close to zero; and close calls (w ≈ 0) have α close to 1/2.
Of course, the plaintiff’s actual winning probability generally differs from α. This probability
is given by p = p(x, w), defined by
p ≡ Φ(0|x, w) = αx1
αx1 + (1− α)x2 , (3)
which follows from (1). It is easy to see that the plaintiff’s winning probability p deviates
from the optimal winning probability α if and only if litigation expenditures are asymmetric,
in which case it skews in favor of the firm that spent more.12
The functional form of p can be interpreted heuristically in terms of random draws from an
urn: suppose that each firm chooses to buy some number of balls to put into an urn; the
court will then draw a single ball from the urn and enter judgment for the firm who bought
it. The “price” of each ball is exogenously given by 1/α for firm 1 and 1/(1 − α) for firm
2. It then follows that p gives the fraction of all balls in the urn that were purchased by
firm 1.13 This heuristic also highlights the fact that claim strength α governs the relative
costs of improving the firms’ winning probabilities: when α grows larger, it becomes less
10This is because F has support R (Assumption 1).
11A later section considers the possibility that society might want courts to adopt certain presumptions
under which the ideal winning probability may deviate from α.
12This is easiest to see when α = 1/2 ⇐⇒ p = x1x1+x2 .13To see this, let ni and ξi be the number and price of the balls purchased by firm i, respectively, where






αx1 + (1− α)x2 = p.
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(more) expensive for the plaintiff (defendant) to increase its winning probability by a small
increment.
2.2 Payoffs, Asymmetric Stakes, and Equilibrium
If firm 1 (the plaintiff) wins, then we assume that firm 2 will be enjoined from engaging in the
challenged practice and will have to pay damages of δ ≥ 0 to firm 1. Following the injunction,
the resulting market outcome involves duopoly competition with profits of pidi > 0 for each i.
By contrast, if firm 1 loses, there is no injunction or damages, so firm 2 will continue engaging
in the challenged practice without penalty. Given that firm 2 is dominant, we assume that
in this case the resulting market outcome involves firm 2 obtaining a monopoly profit of pim,
whereas firm 1 earns no profits because it goes out of business. Such exit by firm 1 does not
imply that firm 2’s conduct is anticompetitive, however.14 Finally, we make the standard
assumption that monopoly generates larger total profits than duopoly: pim > pid1 + pid2 .15
Given these profits, we can define the firms’ expected payoffs from litigation, which we denote
by ui = ui(x|w). These payoffs are given by
u1 = p(pid1 + δ)− x1 u2 = p(pid2 − δ) + (1− p)pim − x2
= pv1 − x1 = pim − pv2 − x2, (4)
where
v1 ≡ pid1 + δ, v2 ≡ pim − pid2 + δ. (5)
Here vi gives the incremental value to firm i when it wins rather than loses, which captures
the firm’s financial stake in the outcome of litigation.16 Note that v2 > v1, since pim > pid1+pid2 .
This reflects that the firms have asymmetric stakes: the defendant has a greater financial
interest on the line, because its challenged conduct enhances total profits. We can now solve
14A procompetitive practice may a lead smaller rival to lose sales because it creates an efficiency (e.g. a
cost reduction) that enables the dominant firm to offer consumers a much better deal than the rival can
match. Thus, while we assume that firm 2’s conduct (if continued) will ultimately lead firm 1 to go out of
business, this result does not itself shed light on whether such conduct is pro- or anticompetitive.
15In fact, this assumption is necessary to explain why the firms do not simply strike a pre-litigation
settlement in which firm 2 agrees to abstain from the challenged practice; such an agreement would be
joint-profit enhancing if the assumption were violated. We discuss settlement in more detail below.
16When firm 1 wins, it avoids losing a duopoly profit of pid1 and also gets damages of δ. When firm 2 wins,
it avoids a profit reduction of pim − pid2 and also avoids paying damages.
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for the equilibrium.




[αv1 + (1− α)v2]2 . (6)
Equivalently, these strategies can be written as
x∗i = vip∗(1− p∗), (7)
where p∗ = p∗(w) is the equilibrium probability that firm 1 prevails:
p∗ = Φ(0|x∗, w) = αv1
αv1 + (1− α)v2 . (8)
Since v2 > v1, it follows from (7) that x∗2 > x∗1. That is, firm 2 spends strictly more on
litigation than does firm 1. In fact, the expenditure ratio (x∗1/x∗2) is equal to the ratio of the
firms’ litigation stakes (v1/v2). This leads to the following key result.
Proposition 3. As a result of the firms’ asymmetric stakes (v2 > v1), the plaintiff’s equi-
librium winning probability is lower than the efficient level: p∗ < α for any w.
Proof. By (8), we have p∗ < α ⇐⇒ v2 > v1.
Thus, the firms’ asymmetric stakes act to skew the equilibrium litigation odds in the defen-
dant’s favor,17 resulting in an inefficiently low win rate for plaintiffs. The equilibrium has
some other interesting properties, too. It follows from (7) that if both firms’ litigation stakes
are scaled up or down by a common factor, then their expenditures will scale by the same
factor, but the plaintiff’s winning probability will remain unchanged.
Additionally, the factor p∗(1 − p∗) in (7) has a useful interpretation: if we think of the
outcome of litigation as a binary random variable that equals unity with probability p∗
and zero otherwise, then p∗(1 − p∗) gives its variance. Therefore, p∗(1 − p∗) quantifies the
17For expediency, we will often use the term “litigation odds” as a shorthand for “the probability that the
plaintiff will win in litigation.”
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uncertainty in the outcome of litigation, which leads to some interesting implications. First,
it follows from (7) that the firms make larger expenditures when the outcome of litigation is
more uncertain. Second, the outcome is maximally uncertain (which occurs when p∗ = 1/2)
when αv1 = (1 − α)v2, where the two sides represent the firms’ stakes weighted by the
strengths of their respective arguments.
More generally, it is easy to see that p∗ rises with the ratio R = αv1(1−α)v2 . In particular, we
have p∗ = R/(R + 1). This shows that the relative stakes v1/v2 are just as important as
the relative merits α/(1− α) in shaping the litigation odds. Thus, for example, even if the
plaintiff has a strong case (α 1/2), the outcome of litigation may still be quite uncertain if
the disparity between the firms’ litigation stakes is large. Finally, we note that the litigation
game has the property that the firms’ expenditures are neither strategic complements nor
strategic substitutes; this is evident from the inverted-U shape of the best response functions,








Figure 1: Best response functions and the equilibrium.
2.3 Inadequacy of Enhanced Damages
We now turn to the impact of damages on the equilibrium. One might expect that awarding
sufficiently large damages could prevent the firms’ asymmetric stakes from distorting the
18Firm i’s best response function is
BRi(xj) = ξi
√
α(1− α)vixj − ξi
ξj
xj ,
where ξ1 ≡ 1/α and ξ2 ≡ 1/(1− α).
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litigation odds. But in fact no finite damages award can eliminate the distortion. Rather, it
would take infinite damages do accomplish this, as demonstrated in the proposition below.
Proposition 4. p∗ → α asymptotically as δ →∞.
Proof. Using (8), this follows because v2/v1 → 1 asymptotically as δ →∞.
Intuitively, increasing δ raises the litigation stakes for both firms, since it is just a transfer
from one to the other. Therefore, while larger damages act to reduce the relative asymmetry,
bringing v2/v1 closer to unity, they will never eliminate it. By contrast, if the stakes were
symmetric (v1 = v2), then plaintiffs would achieve the optimal win rate (p∗ = α) for any
value of δ.
However, enhanced damages may still help to deter potential defendants from engaging in
anticompetitive conduct. Larger damages lead firm 2’s expected litigation payoff to fall,
which could potentially dissuade it from undertaking the disputed practice. But this point
is not in tension with Proposition 4, which says that, conditional on litigation occurring, the
litigation odds will be skewed in defendants’ favor for any δ.
3 Settlement
In this section, we first analyze the impact of ex post (post-judgment) settlements on the
litigation equilibrium. When there are no legal constraints on settlements, nor any transac-
tion costs to prevent effective contracting, we describe the ensuing settlements as “Coasean.”
We explain that the prospect of Coasean settlement will always act to prevent any skew
in the litigation odds in equilibrium, even if the parties have asymmetric stakes. There-
fore, in almost all areas of private litigation, the problem identified above will never arise in
equilibrium, because most areas of law place no restrictions on ex post settlement.
However, we then explain that the problem cannot be avoided in antitrust. This is because
antitrust law generally prohibits ex post settlements in which a losing defendant pays the
plaintiff for the right to continue a practice that has just been declared anticompetitive.
We conclude that antitrust stands apart from most other areas of private law—not because
asymmetric stakes cannot arise in other contexts, but rather because they do not usually
act to distort the litigation odds in equilibrium.
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We then discuss ex ante (pre-judgment) settlements that may seek to reach a compromise
between the two possible outcomes of litigation. We explain that the problematic bias arising
in the equilibrium litigation odds produces a similar problem in ex ante settlements, leading
them to be less competitive than the optimal level.
3.1 Ex Post Settlements
It is well known in the law and economics literature that the prospect of ex post settlements
can affect litigation incentives. In fact, when there are no legal constraints on such settle-
ments, the prospect of Coasean settlement will lead the parties to make symmetric litigation
expenditures in equilibrium, even if they have asymmetric stakes. We can establish this
result using our litigation model and working by backward induction.
3.1.1 Litigation in the Shadow of Coasean Settlement
Consider a more generic version of the litigation game involving two private parties i =
1, 2 engaged in some (non-antitrust) legal dispute surrounding the conduct of party 2 (the
defendant). We assume that the relevant area of law imposes no restrictions on ex post
settlements. Consistent with the last section, let vi denote party i’s litigation stakes (its
incremental value from winning rather than losing), which includes some damages award
δ ≥ 0. As before, we suppose that v2 > v1, so that the parties have asymmetric stakes due
to the disparate payoff effects of an injunction.19 It follows that, if the plaintiff wins, the
parties can jointly-benefit from contracting around the injunction ex post.20 At the margin,
this raises the parties’ joint-payoffs by v2 − v1 > 0. To ensure that both of them are left
better off, party 2 makes a payment to party 1.21 The payment, denoted τ , takes the form
τ ≡ v1 − δ + β(v2 − v1), (9)
19It is easy to see that a pure damages action (one that does not seek an injunction) must involve symmetric
stakes, namely v1 = v2 = δ. Hence, if the litigants have asymmetric stakes, the asymmetry must stem from
the effects of an injunction.
20For example, in a nuisance claim against a noisy factory, a successful plaintiff may win an injunction
ordering the defendant to halt its noisy operations. But the parties may then strike an ex post agreement
in which the plaintiff sells the defendant a license to resume its operations.
21In the alternative case v1 > v2, the parties would instead contract around a win for the defendant, so
that the payment would run from party 1 to party 2.
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where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the bargaining power of party 1, which specifies its share of the gains
from trade (v2−v1). The term −δ reflects that the settlement payment will not duplicate the
damages award, which the defendant pays separately—immediately after the court enters a
judgment for the plaintiff and prior to the ex post settlement. Thus, when the plaintiff wins,
the overall amount it receives from the defendant is τ + δ = v1 + β(v2 − v1).
By backward induction, we know that the court’s judgment will not influence whether or not
the defendant’s conduct will persist ex post: it definitely will.22 Rather, the court’s decision
merely determines whether the defendant will have to pay for this privilege. We can thus
write the parties’ payoff functions as
u1 = k1 + p(τ + δ)− x1, u2 = k2 − p(τ + δ)− x2,
where k1 and k2 give the parties’ payoffs (excluding litigation costs) when the plaintiff loses.
(In the antitrust case we had k1 = 0 and k2 = pim.) Given these payoff functions, the parties
will behave exactly as if they had symmetric stakes. The result is that the plaintiff’s success
probability will not be skewed away from α in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Consider the litigation game where there are no restrictions on Coasean
settlements. There is a unique equilibrium with strategies
x∗1 = x∗2 = (τ + δ)× α(1− α) (10)
and the plaintiff wins with probability p∗ = α.
Intuitively, the settlement payment τ acts just like a damages award: it makes symmetric
contributions to the parties’ litigation stakes. Thus, when the litigants can always bargain
around the court’s judgment, they will behave as if the stakes are symmetric, even if v2 > v1.
Put differently, even if an injunction (if enforced) would have disparate effects on the litigants’
payoffs, this will not be reflected in equilibrium behavior, for the parties anticipate that the
injunction will be lifted (via contract) if the plaintiff wins.
22This is simply an application of the Coase theorem. However, even if transaction costs are sufficiently
low to permit private contracting, the theorem does not obtain if there are legal constraints on ex post
settlements. In this case the court’s judgment may influence the final allocation of rights even if transaction
costs are negligible. This was observed in the context of horizontal patent settlements by Hovenkamp (2018).
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3.1.2 Antitrust Restrictions on Ex Post Settlements
Antitrust litigants would also be eager to strike a Coasean settlement if the plaintiff wins.
They would mutually-benefit from a settlement that maintains (and shares) the monopoly
profit, since this exceeds total duopoly profits.23 However, antitrust prohibits such ex post
settlements. If the court enters a judgment for the plaintiff, declaring the defendant’s con-
duct anticompetitive and issuing an injunction, then the firms cannot lawfully contract
around this by agreeing that firm 2 will compensate firm 1 in exchange for continuing its
exclusionary practice. The plaintiff does not have the authority to “license” the defendant’s
anticompetitive behavior in exchange for cash.
This makes sense, because a settlement that effectuates anticompetitive conduct would have
third-party effects: it would injure downstream consumers. An injury to consumer welfare
does not cease to be an antitrust violation just because firm 1 consents to let it happen.
On the contrary, such a settlement would amount to a collusive agreement in which a dom-
inant firm pays its rival to exit. Thus, if such ex post settlements were not proscribed by
antitrust, they would provide a backdoor mechanism for striking anticompetitive horizontal
agreements. It follows that the skew in the litigation odds identified in Proposition 3 will
persist in equilibrium due to this relatively unusual constraint on the legality of ex post
settlements.24
In principle, the parties may attempt to evade this result by reaching a settlement during
the pendency of an appeal filed by the defendant; they might then petition the court to
vacate the injunction in light of their settlement, which is up to the discretion of the judge.
However, if the appellate court has not yet ruled on the defendant’s appeal—and therefore
has not found that district court erred in finding a violation—then there is no sound basis
for vacating the injunction. On the contrary, it would be a perverse mistake for a court to
condone a settlement authorizing conduct that the court itself found to be anticompetitive.
23Recall that this is why we have v2 > v1.
24Similar restrictions on ex post settlements arise in some IP contexts. For example, in a patent dispute, if
the court deems the patent invalid, the parties cannot circumvent this with a contract in which the patentee
pays the other party to abstain from using the relevant invention (Hovenkamp, 2018). Once the patent is
invalidated, its owner has no more lawful basis for excluding or restraining anyone’s use of the invention.
The illegality of such a settlement is most obvious where the patentee is a monopolist and the other party
is a potential entrant, in which case the settlement amounts to naked market division.
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3.2 Ex Ante Settlements
The preceding discussion raises the question of whether the firms can evade the legal con-
straints on ex post settlements by settling ex ante, before the judge issues a final judgment.
In principle, this could be used to generate a monopoly for the dominant firm, while also
providing a payment to the plaintiff that ensures the deal is mutually-beneficial.25 In this
case, the ex ante settlement would look very much like the kind of ex post settlement that
antitrust forbids. The only difference is that the payment would depend in part on the
plaintiff’s winning probability (p∗), as this determines what size the payment must be in
order to satisfy both firms; the larger is p∗, the larger the payment will be. Because this
kind of settlement always preserves monopoly, the only impact of asymmetric stakes is to
make the payment somewhat smaller.
Of course, this kind of settlement likely would (and certainly should) be condemned in
most instances. Such an arrangement would resemble the “pay-for-delay” patent settlements
considered in the Supreme Court’s recent Actavis decision.26 In a pay-for-delay settlement,
a monopolist (whose monopoly hinges on a patent) pays off a prospective entrant who is
challenging the patent’s validity in court. The deal gives the challenger a large “reverse
payment” in exchange for dropping its challenge and staying out of the market until the
patent is about to expire. The Court held that this kind of settlement is typically illegal
because, in effect, it fully eliminates competition (over the remaining patent term) with
certainty, whereas a final judgment on the patent’s validity had a significant probability of
inviting new competition.27 Similarly, an antitrust suit has the possibility of engendering
greater competition by enjoining an anticompetitive practice, and an ex ante settlement
could be used to extinguish that possibility. The logic of Actavis would then suggest that
such settlements are typically unlawful.
An alternative possibility is that the settlement could reduce, but not eliminate, the ex-
clusionary threat posed by the defendant’s conduct. That is, the defendant agrees to “tone
down” its disputed conduct, but does not suspend it completely. In this case, the settlement’s
impact on competition falls somewhere between the two possible outcomes of litigation. Im-
portantly, this settlement format must not permit firm 2 to make a payment to firm 1, or
25If permitted, this kind of deal would always be Pareto efficient for the firms, since total profits are
maximized under monopoly and a payment term lets the firms divvy up total profits however they like.
26FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013). See also, e.g., Shapiro (2003); Hemphill (2006); Hovenkamp
(2019).
27That a final judgment has “significant probability” of invalidating the patent can be inferred when the
payment is sufficiently large (e.g. larger than the cost of litigation). See, e.g., Edlin et al. (2015).
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else the firms will always mutually-agree to let firm 2 continue its exclusionary conduct in
full, resulting in the same kind of monopoly-for-cash settlement considered above.28
Consider an illustrative example. The defendant is engaging in exclusive dealing that pre-
vents N large suppliers of an essential input from selling to the plaintiff-rival. If the plaintiff
prevails in court, all N of these deals will be enjoined. In ex ante settlement negotiations, the
firms bargain over a reduction S in the number of exclusivity contracts, resulting in N − S
agreements remaining in force. For simplicity, we will assume that the firms’ profits under
such a settlement are linear in S.29 The absence of a payment ensures that the maximally-
anticompetitive settlement outcome (S = 0) is generally not acceptable to the plaintiff, as
it anticipates getting a more favorable result from litigation; similarly, the defendant will
generally not agree to the most procompetitive outcome (S = N). Instead, a mutually-
agreeable settlement will have to produce an outcome that lines up with the expected result
of litigation.30 Specifically, letting p∗ denote the plaintiff’s winning probability, the firms will
agree to eliminate about S = p∗N of the exclusive deals, which coincides with the expected
result of litigation.31
This settlement is clearly preferable to the sort of monopoly-for-cash agreement considered
earlier, and there are good reasons for thinking such settlements would very likely be lawful.32
However, our main point is just to point out that such settlements will be systematically
under-competitive as a result of asymmetric stakes. Because the asymmetry distorts the
litigation odds, it will similarly distort the firms’ expectations about litigation and, by ex-
tension, the competitiveness of their settlement. Thus, the problem is not that the settlement
outcome will fail to comport with the expected result of litigation, but rather that the latter
benchmark has been distorted by a downward bias in the plaintiff’s winning probability.
For example, suppose that α = 1/2, whereas p∗ = 1/4. Then ideally the settlement would
28A more permissive rule would merely proscribe payments in excess of the likely cost of litigation. This
cap on the payment has often been promoted in the pay-for-delay context (see Edlin et al., 2015), and the
Actavis majority acknowledged it as a reasonable benchmark.










30The role of the payment was to avoid this incentive compatibility constraint by letting the defendant
compensate the plaintiff in a way that does not translate into greater competition.
31For simplicity, we are ignoring the likelihood that profits are nonlinear in the number of exclusive deals.
32First, this view is consistent with the policy underpinning the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision—namely,
that we would like horizontal settlements to generate roughly the same amount of competition as the expected
result of litigation—a normative standard first proposed by Shapiro (2003). (See also Hovenkamp and Lemus
(2019) for discussion of how this standard can be administered by analyzing the structure of the settlement
agreement.) Second, it is generally not feasible to demand that a horizontal settlement be more competitive
than the expected result of litigation: such a result would engender lower total profits than the firms expect
to obtain through litigation, in which case it could not be mutually beneficial. Thus, a more stringent
standard would have the perverse consequence of making settlement impossible.
17
involve the defendant reducing its exclusivity commitments by half (S = αN), because that
result is commensurate with the expected result of unbiased litigation. But, because the
plaintiff’s actual (biased) winning probability is p∗ = 1/4, the defendant will instead reduce
its exclusivity commitments by just a quarter (S = p∗N).
4 Presumptions
Our analysis in Section 2 showed asymmetric stakes lead the plaintiff’s equilibrium winning
probability p∗ to be strictly lower than the optimal level, α. Further, we showed in Section 2.3
that enhanced damages cannot prevent this systematic distortion. However, in this section
we show that courts could address the problem by modifying the plaintiff’s evidentiary
burden. Specifically, we consider how courts might adjust the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden
by using a presumption to augment their decision-making.
A presumption leads courts to maintain an initial predisposition toward one outcome or the
other, although this can be rebutted if evidence favoring the opposite result is sufficiently
compelling. This makes a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden either “lighter” or “heavier,” depend-
ing on which side the presumption favors. We implement this in our model by supposing
that courts’ decision-making process is modified in the following way: rather than entering
judgment for the plaintiff whenever it observes a signal value y < 0, as assumed previously,
we now assume that the plaintiff wins whenever y < η, where η is some real number. We
interpret a nonzero value of η as a presumption. A presumption with η > 0 (resp. η < 0)
makes it systematically easier (resp. harder) for plaintiffs to win, all else being the same,
and the magnitude of this effect is governed by the absolute value |η|.
We next solve the litigation game for the case of an arbitrary presumption η and explain
how the value of η could be set to counter the systematic distortion created by asymmetric
stakes. We also consider the possibility that there are also independent reasons—relating to
the nature of the defendant’s conduct and its propensity to injure consumers—for using a
presumption to modify the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden.
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4.1 Litigation Equilibrium with a Presumption
Let us fix a presumption η ∈ R, so that the plaintiff wins in litigation if and only if the court
observes a signal satisfying y < η. We define αη = αη(w) by
αη = F (η|w). (11)
This is exactly analogous to the definition of α in (2), which would now be denoted by α0,
reflecting that it corresponds to the absence of a presumption (η = 0). Then, conditional
on x and w, the probability that firm 1 will prevail in litigation is given by pη = pη(x, w),
defined by
pη = Φ(η|x, w) = αηx1
αηx1 + (1− αη)x2 . (12)
Adding a presumption affects the firms’ payoffs only by influencing the litigation odds. Thus,
payoff functions will take the same functional form as before, but with p now replaced by
the more general term pη. It is easy to compute the equilibrium in the litigation game with
a presumption.
Proposition 6. In the antitrust litigation game with a presumption η, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium x∗η = x∗η(w) with component strategies
x∗i,η =
αη(1− αη)v2i vj
[αηv1 + (1− αη)v2]2 = vip
∗
η[1− p∗η], (13)
where p∗η = p∗η(w) is the equilibrium probability that the plaintiff wins:
p∗η = Φ(η|x∗η, w) =
αηv1
αηv1 + (1− αη)v2 . (14)
Proof. The result follows from the proof of Proposition 2, but with α and p replaced by αη
and pη, respectively.
This is just a modest generalization of Proposition 2, which can now be viewed as capturing
the special case of η = 0. It is easy to verify that αη is strictly increasing in η, and therefore
p∗η is likewise increasing in η. Accordingly, if η > 0, then we have αη > α0 and therefore
p∗η > p
∗
0, so that the presumption improves the plaintiff’s litigation odds; the converse occurs
when η < 0.
By inspection of (13), a presumption will not prevent the firms from making asymmetric
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expenditures in equilibrium; that is, we still have x∗2,η > x∗1,η for any η. But this does not
imply that a presumption cannot eliminate the distortion in the litigation odds, because the
presumption still affects the plaintiff’s equilibrium winning probability. The value of η can
therefore be adjusted to undo the distortion created by asymmetric stakes. For example, we
could choose the value η = η̂ defined by p∗
η̂
= α0. Using (14), η̂ is determined by
αη̂ =
α0v2
α0v2 + (1− α0)v1 . (15)
However, this is not very useful, because α0 is a function of w, which the court does not
observe. Instead, what we need is a notion of an optimal presumption that does not rely
on information about the true welfare effect arising in any given case. To accomplish this,
we will suppose that a legal authority (e.g. Congress or the Supreme Court) chooses an
optimal presumption based on probabilistic information about the welfare effects generated
by the defendant’s conduct, as captured by a Bayesian prior. This leads to a presumption
that accounts not only for asymmetric stakes, but also any underlying predisposition of the
challenged practice toward pro- or anticompetitive effects.
4.2 Optimizing Presumptions for Specific Practices
In antitrust, presumptions are typically employed when there is a belief among courts that a
given practice is, in general, usually anticompetitive or usually procompetitive, even though
it may be difficult to estimate its welfare effects directly in any given case.33 Such beliefs can
be represented by a Bayesian prior. To make this explicit, let ρ(w) be a prior probability
density over the welfare effects generated by a particular type of practice (e.g. exclusive
dealing or vertical merger).34 Hence, before any case-specific facts are accounted for, the
prior probability that the practice is anticompetitive is given by Pρ{w < 0} = ∫ 0−∞ ρ(w)dw.
We make the following assumption on the prior ρ.
Assumption 3. The prior density ρ(w) is symmetric with support R.
We let µ denote the mean welfare effect under ρ, which is also the median in light of the
above assumption. The sign of µ captures whether the relevant practice is regarded as usually
anticompetitive (µ < 0), usually procompetitive (µ > 0), or neutral on average (µ = 0). In
order to fix an optimal presumption, we must ask about the posterior probability that a
33For a discussion of antitrust presumptions, see Gavil and Salop (2020).
34As this suggests, our analysis is now conditional on a particular type of restrictive practice.
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practice is anticompetitive, conditional on the signal observed by the court and the firms’
litigation expenditures. Letting φ ≡ ∂Φ/∂y denote the signal density, Bayesian-updating
gives the following posterior probability of anticompetitive harm:





We assume that the optimal presumption is that which would perfectly effectuate the
preponderance-of-evidence standard. This means that the defendant’s conduct should be
condemned if and only if the observed signal value y (viewed in light of the prior) suggests
that the defendant’s conduct is more likely to be anticompetitive than procompetitive—i.e.
w is more likely to be negative than nonnegative. It follows that the optimal value of η is
that which ensures the above posterior probability is equal to 1/2 when y = η.
As (16) indicates, posterior probabilities depend on the firms’ expenditures. But recall that
the court does not observe x in any given case. Thus, to avoid an ambiguity over x, we must
specify a decision rule about how firms choose their expenditures; we can then compute
posterior probabilities under the assumption that the firms always adhere to this decision
rule. There are two such specifications worth considering—namely, symmetric expenditures35
and equilibrium expenditures. These possibilities give rise to alternative conceptions of the
optimal presumption, which are described below:
Pure Conduct-Based Presumption: The optimal presumption, denoted η˜,
conditional on the assumption that firms make symmetric expenditures (x1 =
x2). The value of η˜ is pinned down by
Pρ{w < 0 | y = η˜, x1 = x2} = 12 . (17)
First-Best Presumption: The optimal presumption, denoted η∗, conditional
on the assumption that firms make equilibrium expenditures (x = x∗η). The value
of η∗ is pinned down by
Pρ{w < 0 | y = η∗, x = x∗η∗} =
1
2 . (18)
Pure Stakes-Based Presumption: The special case η∗0 of the first-best pre-
sumption when the prior has µ = 0.
35The specific value of x1 = x2 is irrelevant, because φ(y|x, w) reduces to f(y|w) whenever expenditures
are symmetric (Assumptions 1-2), in which case x drops out of the posterior in (16).
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As the name suggests, the pure conduct-based presumption η˜ focuses exclusively on the
nature of the defendant’s conduct—its propensity to elicit anticompetitive effects—as cap-
tured by the prior ρ. This presumption thus ignores the problem of asymmetric stakes by
assuming x1 = x2. By contrast, the first-best presumption η∗ accounts for both the nature
of the defendant’s conduct and the distortion created by asymmetric stakes.36 Finally, the
pure stakes-based presumption is just the first-best presumption in the case where the prior
takes a neutral position on the practice in question (µ = 0), in which case the only need for
a presumption is to correct the distortion created by asymmetric stakes. We now present
this Section’s main result.
Proposition 7. For any prior ρ(w) satisfying Assumption 3, we have
(i) sign{η˜} = −sign{µ}.37
(ii) η∗ > η˜.





Unsurprisingly, part (i) indicates that if the relevant conduct is predisposed toward anticom-
petitive effects (µ < 0), then the pure conduct-based presumption must counterbalance this
by tilting the scales in plaintiffs’ favor (η˜ > 0), and vice versa; otherwise we have η˜ = µ = 0.
However, part (ii) states the first-best presumption will always be strictly more favorable
to plaintiffs than the conduct-based one, regardless of what value the latter takes. This
reflects the fact that asymmetric stakes always skew the litigation odds in defendants’ favor.
Therefore, countering this distortion always requires increasing the presumption.
The pure stakes-based presumption η∗0 is optimal when courts maintain a neutral prior
over the practice in question (µ = 0). We can use equation (19) to see how η∗0 addresses the
problem of asymmetric stakes. Consider the case where the true welfare effect is exactly w =
0. Then, absent a presumption, the strength of the plaintiff’s case would be α0 = F (0|0) =
1/2, whereas the plaintiff’s equilibrium winning probability would be p∗0 = v1/(v1+v2) < 1/2;
this is the usual distortion created by asymmetric stakes. Now consider what happens when
we implement the presumption η∗0 defined in (19), while continuing to assume w = 0. The
presumption reduces the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, so that the strength of its claim
36Note that, as indicated in (18), the first-best presumption η∗ must account for the fact that the firms’
equilibrium expenditures themselves depend on the choice of presumption.
37In the special case ρ(·) = f(·|µ), we have η˜ = −µ (see the proof of part (i)).
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increases to








which induces the desired winning probability in equilibrium:
p∗η∗0 =
αη∗0v1








= 12 = α0. (21)
However, recalling that p∗η and αη are functions of w, we note that the presumption does not
achieve p∗η∗0 (w) = α0(w) for all values of w. Instead, by (globally) shifting the equilibrium
probability upward from p∗0(w) to p∗η∗0 (w), the presumption ensures only that the latter is
everywhere closer to α0(w).38 It is not possible to do better than this: to achieve p∗η∗0 (w) =
α0(w) globally would require making the presumption a function w, but that would be
inconsistent with the courts’ inability to observe w.39 In light of this constraint, we have
employed a weaker notion of optimality—namely, that the optimal presumption is that which
perfectly effectuates the preponderance-of-evidence standard, as discussed above.
5 Extensions
5.1 Consumer Class Actions
Our analysis has shown that when the plaintiff is a rival of the dominant firm, the firms
have asymmetric stakes that distort the litigation odds in the defendant’s favor. But an
excluded rival does not internalize the consumer welfare effects of the defendant’s conduct.
This raises the question of whether the problem of asymmetric stakes would vanish (or even
reverse directions) if the plaintiff instead were a class composed of all injured consumers. In
that case, one might think that, if the defendant’s conduct reduces total welfare, then the
asymmetric stakes would be reversed. However, that is not necessarily correct. An injunc-
tion’s incremental benefit to consumers may or may not exceed the incremental reduction
in the defendant’s profits. The reason is that the defendant internalizes not only the injunc-
tion’s effect in reducing in total profits, but also its effect in reallocating some profits to the
38One can verify that p∗η∗0 (w) crosses α0(w) from above at w = 0 (and nowhere else). By contrast, p
∗
0(w)
lies everywhere below both α0(w) and p∗η∗0 (w).39See equation (15) and the discussion that follows.
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excluded rival.40
However, even if an injunction would benefit consumers by more than it reduces the defen-
dant’s profits, the defendant is likely to internalize larger litigation stakes than the consumer
class for several reasons. First, there are the usual practical difficulties in achieving efficient
collective action by a large group of injured parties due to various externality, free-riding, and
information problems associated with class actions generally.41 Second, antitrust standing
rules limit potential recovery to those consumers who actually bought the relevant product
at a supra-competitive price; consumers who were deterred from buying the product (whose
injuries are thus reflected in deadweight loss) are not eligible to join the class. Thus, the
class will only partially internalize the social benefits of an injunction.
Finally, and most importantly, it is not the consumers but rather their attorneys who make
the operative choice of litigation effort in this context. Class action attorneys do not charge
hourly fees, but rather work on a contingency basis, earning payment only upon winning
the case or securing a monetary settlement; their payment is then given as a percentage of
the total monetary award. The consumers themselves do not make out-of-pocket expenses
on litigation. Rather, the attorneys choose how much costly effort to invest (including costs
of retaining experts, consultants, etc.) in consideration of the likelihood of winning and
the expected size of the payment they would receive upon success. But as a result of their
payoff structure, they do not internalize the consumer value from an injunction, and they
internalize only a portion of any awarded damages. By contrast, the defendant internalizes
both the full damages award and the negative profit effects of an injunction. As a result,
the defendant’s litigation stakes will be substantially greater than those internalized by the
operative decision-maker on the consumer side.42
40An injunction reduces producer surplus by ∆PS ≡ pim − (pid1 + pid2), which must satisfy ∆PS < |w| if
the injunction would increase total welfare. However, the defendant internalizes a profit change of ∆pi2 ≡
pim−pid2 > ∆PS. Therefore, it is possible that ∆pi2 > |w| even if the injunction would increase total surplus.
41See, e.g., Spier (2007); Issacharoff (1996); Morawetz (1993).
42One might wonder whether the asymmetric stakes might be reversed in a consolidated action with
plaintiffs comprising both a rival firm and a consumer class might exceed the stakes for the defendant. This
would not seem to be possible: the rival internalizes only a portion of a social value of an injunction—a lesser
amount than the profit losses internalized by the defendant—whereas the class attorneys internalize only a
portion of the monetary award given to its consumer clients. Hence the defendant continues to internalize a
larger financial stake. In any case, consumer class actions usually follow successful suits by other plaintiffs;
it is not typical for a consumer action to be consolidated with an action brought by a rival.
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5.2 Fee Shifting
By statute, a successful private antitrust plaintiff may recover “a reasonable attorney fee”
from the defendant.43 There is no analogous rule for successful defendants, and hence private
antitrust litigation involves “one-way fee shifting” However, for several reasons, this is very
different from a rule in which a losing defendant must pay the plaintiff’s subjectively-chosen
litigation expenditure, as given by x1 in our model.44
First, the rule requires the defendant to pay an amount the court deems “reasonable” for
the case in question, as opposed to the actual amount paid by the plaintiff to its attorneys.45
Courts thus rely on one of several objective approaches for determining a “reasonable” fee,
which can be as coarse as simply setting the fee equal to a percentage of damages. Conse-
quently, in practice the plaintiff’s fee award “can be entirely independent of what the plaintiff
has agreed to pay its lawyer.”46 Further, because the approaches used to calculate fees are
so imprecise, fee awards are infamously random and inconsistent.47 Finally, fee shifting does
not cover several of the most significant aspects of the plaintiff’s litigation expenditure: the
costs of hiring testifying experts, non-testifying experts, and consultants.48
For these reasons, a sensible way to capture fee shifting in our model would be to introduce
some fixed monetary award (i.e. one that is independent of x1) that reflects the court’s
assessment of what fees would be “reasonable” for the case in question; the plaintiff would
then recover this additional amount in the event that it wins. But then the award would
act exactly like an increase in the damages parameter δ. Thus, following our discussion of
damages in Section 2.3, we conclude that antitrust’s one-way fee shifting acts to reduce the
distortion created by asymmetric stakes, but does not eliminate it.
43Clayton Act §4 (15 U.S.C. §15(a)).
44If one modifies our model so that the defendant must pay x1 to the plaintiff upon losing, then the plain-
tiff’s best-response behavior becomes pathological, prescribing an infinite expenditure in some situations.
But this can be avoided by assuming that each firm’s probability of losing can never fall below some small
lower bound ε > 0 (e.g. the risk of losing on a technicality).
45This is intended to avoid a moral hazard problem: plaintiffs might rack up excessive bills if they could
expect full reimbursement of whatever amount they choose to spend.
462 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶330e, at pp. 48-49 (4th ed., 2014).
47E.g., Berger (1977) notes that fee awards amount to a “roll of the dice” and that “[t]he only truly
consistent thread...is their almost complete inconsistency.”
48See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (noting
that fees paid to experts and consultants “are not recoverable” by the successful antitrust plaintiff.) This
follows a Supreme Court decision that fee shifting statutes exclude expert/consultant fees unless such fees
are explicitly provided for. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987).
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6 Conclusion
When an antitrust defendant is a dominant firm accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller
rival or entrant, the defendant generally has much higher stakes than does the plaintiff.
These asymmetric stakes and their effect on litigation effort likely are very important for
antitrust litigation involving exclusionary conduct. The loss of monopoly power can reduce
the net present value of the dominant firm’s profits by billions of dollars, while an injunction
generally would provide substantially lower profits to the plaintiff, and damages are unlikely
to affect the relative stakes by that much. For example, while it is hard to know what
fraction of Windows’ profits were at stake in the Microsoft litigation, Microsoft’s stock price
fell from about $52 on Friday March 31 to about $42.5 on April 4, the day after the antitrust
opinion was released—-a reduction of about $80 billion.49 By contrast, the stakes for the
private plaintiffs such as RedHat, VA Linux, Sun and Novell were surely much smaller.
This paper explores the impact of this systematic imbalance on litigation with endogenous
effort. Our model shows that asymmetric stakes always lead the plaintiff’s winning proba-
bility to be distorted below the efficient level. The problem is not avoided by settling before
judgment, for we have also shown that asymmetric stakes lead ex ante settlements to gen-
erate too little competition. While asymmetric stakes can arise in all areas of private law,
we explain that they do not usually cause this kind of distortion in equilibrium; the distor-
tion arises in antitrust only because it constrains the legality of certain ex post settlements
that would be antithetical to antitrust policy. This constraint affects decision-making at the
litigation stage, leading the asymmetric stakes to distort the equilibrium.
We show that enhanced damages can help to reduce the problem, but can never eliminate it.
However, courts could do better by reducing the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden to offset the
distortion. This is a timely issue in light of the current concerns that antitrust law has been
an insufficient constraint on the conduct of dominant firms,50 which has led to legislative
proposals as well as academic recommendations for judicial adjustments to legal standards.51
49This reduction could be an underestimate because the judge’s earlier announced factual findings signaled
a substantial likelihood that there would be some liability, and there was a probability of a successful future
appeal. Microsoft paid out about $5 billion in damages in private cases and about $4 billion in fines to the
European Commission. See Gavil and First (2014) at p. 274.
50See, e.g., the Stigler Center’s recent report on potentially anticompetitive practices by dominant
digital platforms, available at https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/media/news/committee-on-digital-
platforms-final-report.
51See, e.g., Gavil and Salop (2020); Federico et al. (2020).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By differentiating equation (1) from Assumption 1, it follows that
∂Φ(y|x, w)
∂x2






Then part (ii) follows immediately from (22), while part (iii) follows from (23). By Assump-
tion 2, it is clear that the signal is unbiased if x1 = x2, since f is symmetric about w. But
part (ii) implies the signal must be biased whenever x1 6= x2, since any change in the ratio
x2/x1 will skew the distribution in one direction or the other. This establishes part (i).
29
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It is easy to verify that each i’s payoff function is strictly concave. Hence, a best




⇐⇒ α[αx1 + (1− α)x2]− α
2x1
[αx1 + (1− α)x2]2 v1 − 1 = 0
⇐⇒ (1− α)αv1x2 = [αx1 + (1− α)x2]2. (FOC1)
Repeating this for firm 2, we obtain
(1− α)αv2x1 = [αx1 + (1− α)x2]2. (FOC2)
Combining these FOCs, an equilibrium must satisfy v1x∗2 = v2x∗1. Then substituting x∗j =
(vj/vi)x∗i into either FOC and simplifying, we obtain a unique solution
x∗i =
(1− α)αv2i vj
[αv1 + (1− α)v2]2 .




αx∗1 + (1− α)x∗2
=
α× (1−α)αv21v2[αv1+(1−α)v2]2





(1− α)α2v21v2 + (1− α)2αv1v22
= αv1
αv1 + (1− α)v2 .
By inspection, we have x∗i = vip∗(1− p∗) for each i, as desired.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The result follows from the proof of Proposition 2, but with the modification that
now impose v1 = v2 = τ + δ, which reflects that the court’s decision will only determine
whether party 2 has to pay τ + δ to party 1. The desired results then follow immediately
from the expressions given for x∗i and p∗ in Proposition 2, since the latter’s proof is valid for
any positive values of v1 and v2.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Part (i): When litigation expenditures are symmetric, it follows from Assumptions
1 and 2 that the signal density φ(y|x, w) reduces to f(y|w), which is symmetric about w and
depends only on |y − w|. Then η˜ is pinned down by the equation




= 12 . (24)







By the symmetry of ρ and f (Assumptions 2, 3), the product ρ(w)f(w|µ) = ρ(w)f(µ|w) is
symmetric about µ. Therefore, if µ = 0 then the two sides will be equal iff η˜ = 0; but if
µ < 0 (resp. µ > 0), then equality requires that η˜ > 0 (resp. η˜ < 0), as desired. We further
note that, in the special case ρ(w) = f(w|µ), setting η˜ = −µ and using f(a|b) = f(a−b|0) =
f(b− a|0), we find
ρ(w)f(η˜|w) = f(w|µ)f(−µ|w) = f(w − µ|0)f(−µ− w|0) = f(w − µ|0)f(w + µ|0), (26)
which is symmetric about zero. Therefore setting η˜ = −µ satisfies (25) in this case.
Part (ii): Suppose that the firms play equilibrium strategies x∗η, which are themselves con-
ditional on the presumption, as established in Proposition 6. In this case, the optimal
presumption η∗ is pinned down by the equation
Pρ{w < 0 | y = η∗, x = x∗η∗} =
∫ 0
−∞ ρ(w)φ(η∗|x∗η∗ , w)dw∫∞
−∞ ρ(w)φ(η∗|x∗η∗ , w)dw
= 12 . (27)
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Rearranging this equation, we obtain
∫ 0
−∞
ρ(w)φ(η∗|x∗η∗ , w)dw =
∫ ∞
0
ρ(w)φ(η∗|x∗η∗ , w)dw. (28)
Differentiating Φ to obtain φ, we find that φ(y|x, w) = Γ(y|x, w)× f(y|w), where
Γ(y|x, w) ≡ x1x2(
F (y|w)x1 + [1− F (y|w)]x2
)2 . (29)
It is straightforward to verify that








Since x∗2,η > x∗1,η (for any η), this implies that Γ(η|x∗η, w) < 1 whenever η < w, while
Γ(η|x∗η, w) ≥ 1 whenever η is sufficiently larger than w. Then, using (25) from Part (i)







Here we have inserted Γ(η˜|x∗
η˜
, w) into the integrands on both sides of equation (25). This
breaks the equality in (25), because Γ adds weight to the LHS integral while removing weight
from the RHS integral. However, if we replaced Γ(η˜|x∗
η˜
, w)f(η˜|w) with Γ(η∗|x∗η∗ , w)f(η∗|w),
then the two sides above would have to be equal; this follows immediately from equation
(28) and the definition of Γ. Therefore η˜ is not large enough to satisfy (28), ergo η∗ > η˜.
Part (iii): Now assume µ = 0, so that part (i) implies η˜ = 0. In this case, consider the
specific case where the true welfare effect is w = η˜ = 0. We will show that the median signal
(conditional on equilibrium expenditures) in this case coincides with η∗0. If true, then η∗0 is
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pinned down by











F (η∗0|0)v1 + [1− F (η∗0|0)]v2
= 12 (33)




which is the desired expression. To confirm that value of η∗0 must be correct, note that if (and
only if) the court observes y < η∗0, then we can conclude the true value of w is most likely
negative, because: (a) ρ is symmetric about zero; and (b) under equilibrium expenditures,
every positive (resp. negative) value of w has a median signal value that is strictly larger
(resp. smaller) than η∗0.
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